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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-1436
_____________
BARETTA BENTLEY; PERNELA HAYNES, Appellants
v.
MILLENNIUM HEALTHCARE CENTERS II, LLC, 
d/b/a CAREONE AT DUNROVEN, 
f/k/a DUNROVEN HEALTHCARE CENTER;
JOHN DOE 1-5; XYZ CORP. 1-5
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
(06-cv-5939)
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2009
Before: RENDELL, BARRY, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : February 9, 2010)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Baretta Bentley and Pernela Haynes (collectively “plaintiffs”) appeal
2the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of their former employer,
Millenium Healthcare Centers II, LLC, doing business as CareOne at Dunroven, formerly
known as Dunroven Healthcare Center (“Dunroven”).  We will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts.  Prior to their termination, plaintiffs worked as certified
nurse’s aides (“CNAs”) at Dunroven.  On December 15, 2004, plaintiffs and two other
CNAs, Alta Marie Brutus and Marcia Grant, were working their regular shift from 3:00
p.m. to 11:30 p.m.  The CNAs that were scheduled to begin the next shift were unable to
replace them, and a nurse asked all four on-duty CNAs if they could stay past the end of
their shifts.  None of them agreed to stay, and they all clocked-out at the scheduled end of
their shifts.  The following day, Dunroven fired all four CNAs.
On December 17, 2004, two Dunroven Administrators – Margot Domingo,
licensed nursing home administrator, and Helen Graca, human resources and accounts
payable clerk – interviewed each of the terminated employees and obtained written
statements describing their motivations for refusing to work beyond their scheduled
shifts.  
Bentley explained that she had left because her blood pressure was high and that
she needed to go home to take medication.  She claimed that a nurse (not employed by
Dunroven) had taken her blood pressure, but she was unable to substantiate this version
3of events.  Haynes explained that she left because she had seen the CNA who was
scheduled to replace her arrive to start her shift, but this CNA did not clock in until
approximately 12:30 a.m., and Haynes later admitted that she left because her brother had
arrived to give her a ride home.  
Grant explained that she left because she had experienced a bad asthma attack on
the previous day, had visited her treating physician on the morning before her shift, and
had felt tightness in her chest during her shift on December 15.  Grant later verified this
account with a fax from her physician, who indicated that Grant had been to his office on
December 15.  Brutus explained that she left because her oldest son left home at
approximately the same time as she typically returned home, and she was concerned about
leaving her other, younger children at home unattended.  This concern was corroborated
by Graca’s testimony that she had previously assisted Brutus with an investigation by the
Department of Youth and Family Services into a neighbor’s complaint that minor children
had been left unattended at Brutus’ home.
After these interviews, Grant and Brutus were rehired, but plaintiffs were not. 
Plaintiffs claim Grant and Brutus were rehired because they were younger; at this time,
Bentley was sixty-six years old, Haynes was sixty-one years old, and Grant and Brutus
were each forty-five years old.  Dunroven claims that Grant and Brutus were rehired
because they provided verifiable information regarding their decision to leave work on
December 15, whereas plaintiffs did not. 
4Bentley and Haynes each filed actions against Dunroven, alleging that they had
been terminated because of their ages, in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C §§ 621-634, and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1-10:5-49, and in breach of their
employment contracts.  Their cases were consolidated, and on October 22, 2008,
Dunroven moved for summary judgment.  The parties stipulated to the dismissal of
plaintiffs’ contract claims, and by Order dated January 21, 2009, the District Court
granted summary judgment for Dunroven, dismissing plaintiffs’ age discrimination
claims.  The District Court found that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of
discrimination but failed to show Dunroven’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the adverse employment actions was a pretext for discrimination.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a), and
this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This Court reviews the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard that the District
Court was obligated to apply.  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (citation omitted); 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  On summary judgment, “we must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in
5that party’s favor.”  N.J. Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp., 497 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
III.
We evaluate plaintiffs’ claims following the burden-shifting framework
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), which applies to plaintiffs’ claims under both the ADEA and the NJLAD. 
Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of unlawful discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If the
plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
termination.  Id.  If the employer is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff must then
show that the proffered reason was a pretext for a racially discriminatory decision.  Id. at
804-05.
Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that
they were over 40, that they were qualified for their positions, that they suffered adverse
employment actions, and that Dunroven retained (by firing and rehiring) two significantly
younger employees who were similarly situated to the plaintiffs.  Dunroven met its
burden of production by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
decision:  that the two rehired employees presented legitimate and verifiable excuses for
6their behavior, whereas plaintiffs did not.  We agree with the District Court that plaintiffs
failed to meet their ultimate burden of establishing that Dunroven’s proffered justification
was pretextual or that discrimination was a factor in Dunroven’s decision.
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence suggesting that they were terminated,
and the other two CNAs rehired, because of the age differences.  Instead, plaintiffs argue
that Dunroven’s proffered justification was pretextual by highlighting certain
discrepancies in the testimony regarding the circumstances under which Dunroven’s
employment decisions were made:  one witness did not know why Grant and Brutus were
hired, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Br. 14 (citing Appendix (“App.”) 318-19), another witness
did not recall why plaintiffs were terminated, id. 15 (citing App. 355-56), and several of
the witnesses appeared to disagree on who was specifically responsible for the
employment decisions, id. 15-20 (citing App. 293-95, 297-98, 306, 345, 348-49, 350-52). 
None of these apparent inconsistencies casts doubt on the reason that Dunroven
terminated plaintiffs while retaining the other two CNAs involved in the same incident. 
Plaintiffs have therefore failed to meet their burden to show Dunroven’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiffs remaining contentions also lack merit.  Plaintiffs argue that
discrimination cases often turn on factual questions, id. 24, and that employment
discrimination can be subtle and difficult to detect, id. 25-26.  Neither of these
observations warrant reversing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Plaintiffs
7also point out that New Jersey anti-discrimination law occasionally deviates from federal
law, id. 28-29; see McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 828 (3d Cir. 1994), but
plaintiffs face the same burden under both statutes.  “[U]nder New Jersey law, as under
federal law, plaintiffs have always retained the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the
actions they challenged were due to discrimination.”  McKenna, 32 F.3d at 828 (citations
omitted).  Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that Dunroven’s proffered
justification was pretextual, and the District Court properly granted summary judgment
for Dunroven.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
